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Schwartz:
Section 1983
SECTION 1983
LITIGATION

Hon. George C. Pratt:
From here we move on to Professor Schwartz. He is going to
review significant cases in the area of local government which the
Supreme Court decided last Term. Professor Schwartz is known
to many of you. He is a Professor of Law here at Touro and is a
co-author of the leading treatise on section 1983 litigation. 1 He
teaches constitutional law, evidence and federal courts among
other things. He has been active in the civil rights area for most
of his legal career. So, Professor Schwartz, will you take over
from here, please.
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz*:
INTRODUCTION

Good morning. When we started this program five years ago, it
seemed that the Supreme Court was deciding an extraordinary
number of section 19832 cases each Term. But by now this has
become a routine practice in the Supreme Court. Each Term the
* Professor Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1983
litigation and, among other things, co-authors, with John E. Kirklin, a leading
treatise entitled Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees (2d. ed.
1991 & 1994 Cumulative Supp. No. 1). Professor Schwartz has also been the
co-chair of the Practicing Law Institute Program on § 1983 litigation for over
ten years. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of
Mitchell S. Drucker and Lisa S. Levinson of the Touro Law Review.
1. 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRLI, SECTION 1983
LTIGATON: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES (2d ed. 1991 and Supp. 1994).
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ & KuLIN)].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
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Supreme Court gives us a large number of important section
1983 decisions. Upon thinking about it, that is not so surprising,
given both the fact that section 1983 litigation is quite
multifaceted and because it produces such a large volume of
litigation.
The cases from the United States Supreme Court's last Term
fall into four categories. First I am going to list the categories,
then I will come back and get to the cases within those
categories. First, the constitutional rights that are enforceable
under section 1983; second, the subject of municipal liability;
third, three decisions dealing with immunities; and, fourth, a
major decision dealing with the subject of statutory attorneys'
fees. The decisions from an overall standpoint produced a mixed
bag of results: some of them were favorable to section 1983
plaintiffs, some to defendants. My own evaluation is that,
overall, it was a fairly good Term for section 1983 claimants.
ENFORCEABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER
SECTION 1983
Now, let me start with the constitutional rights. Obviously the
Supreme Court decides a number of important constitutional
decisions each Term. That was true last Term as well. Of the
constitutional decisions decided by the Court last Term, there are
two that stand out in my mind as raising recurring issues in
section 1983 litigation. The first is the Court's decision in
Helling v. McKinney. 3 In that case, the plaintiff-prisoner alleged
in his complaint that he had been assigned to a cell with a
cellmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. 4 A hundred
cigarettes a day is a lot of cigarettes. He used the magical
language in his complaint, that the prison officials, acting with
"deliberate indifference," had exposed him to secondary tobacco
3. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).

4. Id. at 2478. The complaint also alleged that cigarettes were sold to
inmates without informing them of the health hazards to non-smoking cell
mates and that continually burning cigarettes released some type of chemical.
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smoke, and that this jeopardized his health in violation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 5 In Helling, the Court ruled that the prisoner had
stated a proper section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim in his
complaint. 6 In that sense, the holding of the Court is a limited
one. It could be viewed as limited because all the Court held was
that this complaint alleged a violation of Eighth Amendment
rights. In the course of coming to that conclusion, however, the
Court did make what I think is a significant ruling. The Court
said that the Eighth Amendment does not require that a plaintiff
show that he or she is presently suffering from a medical
problem. 7 The Eighth Amendment encompasses conditions of
confinement - here is the language of the Court - "that is sure

or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the
next week or month or year." 8 I would think that, if you are a
plaintiff, you would say - "I will take the very likely standard
over the certainty language." Although the Court was not too
definite about the probability factor, it gave some examples. The
Court said, for example, that under the Eighth Amendment,
prisoners could successfully complain about being subjected to
contaminated water or to a communicable disease even though
not presently suffering any symptoms. 9
Of course, as I said, it is a limited holding because the Court
only ruled that the prisoner stated a proper Eighth Amendment
claim. Establishing an Eighth Amendment violation is a different
matter. Here, the Court said that to establish a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, what the prisoner is going to have to do on
5. Id. The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
6. 113 S.Ct. at 2481.
7. Id. at 2480-81.

8. Id. at 2480.
9. Id.; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). In Hutto, prison
inmates were placed into crowded cells with prisoners who had infectious
maladies including hepatitis and venereal disease. Id. at 682. The Court stated
that the Eighth Amendment must remedy the prison environment despite the
absence of an allegation of immediate harm. Id.
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remand is to show violations of the objective and subjective
prongs that the Court has identified for Eighth Amendment
prison condition cases. 10 In the prior decision of Wilson v.
Seiter,11 the Court reaffirmed that the objective prong requires
the plaintiff to show serious injuries. 12 In Helling, the Court said
that an inquiry of the scientific and statistical data that relates to
the likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer serious harm is
required. 13 Now, I view that as a type of factual inquiry because
the Court is talking about scientific and statistical data. In
addition, the serious injury inquiry will have to involve the
question of whether society views the risk of health damage to
the prisoner as being violative of contemporary standards of
decency. 14 I take that as raising a legal question, whether this
governmental action is violative of contemporary standards of
decency. This has been treated by the Supreme Court as a legal

matter. 15

The subjective prong in Eighth Amendment prison condition
cases requires an inquiry into the state of mind of the pertinent
prison officials. 16 To make out an Eighth Amendment violation it
10. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
11. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
12. Id. at 2324. The Wilson Court stated that its "holding in [Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)] turned on the objective component of an
Eighth Amendment prison claim (was the deprivation sufficiently
serious?) .... ." Id. In Rhodes, the Court held that the lodging of two inmates
in a single cell did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. 452
U.S. at 348-50.
13. 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
14. Id. The Court stated that the Plaintiff must show that the risk of being
exposed to secondary smoke is not a risk that today's society chooses to
tolerate. Id.
15. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (stating
that "contemporary standards of decency" are infringed by prison officials who
maliciously cause harm to inmates).
16. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482; see also Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321
(1991). The Court in Wilson held that, while the Eighth Amendment applies to
conditions of confinement that are not formally imposed as a sentence for a
crime, such claims require proof of a subjective component. Id. at 2326-27.
Furthermore, where the claim alleges inhumane conditions of confinement or
failure to attend to a prisoner's medical needs, the standard to be employed is
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would not be enough for the plaintiff to show that what happened
to him was the result of negligence, inadvertence or good faith
error. 17 The plaintiff would have to show that there was some
wrongfulness in terms of the intention of the prison officials. 18
Here is a surprise, Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's

holding that the complaint in Helling stated an Eighth
Amendment violation. 19 The second surprise is that he was
joined by Justice Scalia in dissent.20 The dissent essentially

reiterated the position that Justice Thomas took in a prior case,
Hudson v. McMillian,2 1 in which he, again joined by Justice
Scalia, argued that the Eighth Amendment should be limited to
the criminal sentence, and does not provide any protection
against prison conditions. 2 2 The dissenters in Helling argued that,
"deliberate indifference" as articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976). 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
17. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). The Court in
Whitley was faced with the issue of whether an inmate who was shot by a
prison guard during an attempt to quell a prison disturbance had been subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment. d. at 314. In holding that such actions do not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the Court stated that:
"After incarceration, only the '"unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain"'

. . .

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the

Eighth Amendment." To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that
does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety ....It is
obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with
establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or
restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
18. The Court stated that, on remand, the trial court should determine the
subjective factor of deliberate indifference in light of the prison authorities'
current attitudes and conduct. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482. While this case was
being decided, the director of the prison adopted a new smoking policy within
the facility. Id. The Court stressed that the adoption of this policy "will bear
heavily on the inquiry into deliberate indifference." Id.
19. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
21. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
22. Id. at 1005-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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in any case, if the Eighth Amendment is read to provide
protection in prison condition cases, the line should be drawn at
prisoners who are suffering actual present injury rather than, as
23
in this case, threatened injury.

The second constitutional decision that I believe raises
recurring section 1983 issues is Soldal v. Cook County. 24 The
issue in Soldal was whether a deputy sheriff's participation in the
removal of a mobile home from a mobile home park constituted a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 25 The
employees of the mobile home, with the sheriff present and
assisting by making sure that nobody interfered with the
employees, wrenched the sewer and water connections off of the
mobile home. 26 The mobile home was then hooked onto a trailer
and moved to a neighboring property. 27
The Seventh Circuit, in a decision written by Judge Posner,
held that while literally there was governmental action which may
be viewed as a seizure, such governmental action does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment because this case deals with a
pure deprivation of property. 2 8 In Judge Posner's view, in order
to bring the Fourth Amendment into play, it must be shown that
the governmental action interfered with privacy interests. 29 There
23. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2485 (Thomas, J. dissenting). While criticizing

the Court's holding in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), Justice Thomas
stated that while "stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a dubious
precedent... it does not demand that such a precedent be expanded to its
outer limits." Id.
24. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
25. Id at 542. The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.
amend. IV.
26. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 541.
27. Id. at 542.

U.S. CONST.

28. Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).

29. Id. In arguing against a Fourth Amendment violation, Judge Posner
stated:

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/4

6

Schwartz: Section 1983

1994]

SECTION 1983

319

were no privacy interests that were implicated in this case, at
least according to the circuit court. 30 Judge Posner went on to
say that if we should find this type of governmental action to be
within the Fourth Amendment, it would create the unwholesome
result of trivializing the Fourth Amendment by bringing garden
variety evictions and repossessions within the Fourth Amendment
as well. 3 1 So he concluded for the Seventh Circuit that when
there is a pure deprivation of property, the plaintiff may not
claim protection under the Fourth Amendment, only under the
Due Process Clause. 32
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice
White, rejected what the Court referred to as the "creative"
Seventh Circuit interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 33 Now,
I normally think of creativity as being a positive attribute, but I
think in this instance it was not meant to be a compliment. What
Justice White actually said was that the Supreme Court rejects
this creative interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as being
completely at odds with its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 34
In fact, Justice White said that the Soldal's home "was not only
seized, it literally was carried away," which, in his mind, gave
"new meaning to the term 'mobile home.'" 35

Literally there was a "seizure" here, but to use a literal interpretation of
a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago to make every
repossession and eviction with police assistance actionable under-of all
things - the Fourth Amendment would both trivialize the amendment
and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from
the state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be
prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy
interests.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1075-76.

32. Id. at 1077. Judge Posner, however, noted that a claim for deprivation
of property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed because of the
existence and availability of adequate state law judicial remedies. Id. at 1076.
33. Sodal, 113 S. Ct. at 547-48.
34. Id. at 548.

35. Id. at 543. Justice White firmly stated that the Court "fail[ed] to see
how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner
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Justice White stressed that the only question before the Court
was whether the governmental action constituted a seizure. 36 He
said, we are not here to decide whether there was a Fourth
Amendment violation. 37 That would depend upon the
reasonableness of the governmental conduct. 38 We have only the
limited issue before us as to whether the Seventh Circuit was
correct in concluding that no seizure had taken place. 39 Now, in
rejecting the circuit court's "creative" Seventh Circuit
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court said that in the Fourth Amendment there is
protection against governmental seizures and there is protection
against governmental

searches. 4 0 When the government

is

claimed to have engaged in an unconstitutional search, it is true
that the constitutional focus has been whether the government has
interfered with reasonable expectations of privacy. 4 1 This case,

however, does not deal with a governmental search. It deals with
a seizure, a seizure of property. Therefore, the inquiry is whether

alleged ...can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of
the Fourth Amendment." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). The
Jacobsen Court explained:
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment ...protects two types of

expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A
"search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs
where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property.
Id. at 113.
41. Id.; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding
that plastic garbage bags left on the street do not carry an expectation of
privacy giving rise to Fourth Amendment protection); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (stating that the Fourth Amendment creates a right to
privacy against certain government intrusions but not a right to privacy in
general).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/4
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the government has interfered in a meaningful way with an
individual's possessory interest in the particular property. 42
The fact that in this case the Due Process Clause might provide
the Soldals, the mobile home owners, with constitutional
protection, did not detract from the fact that they could also seek
protection under the Fourth Amendment. 43 It is certainly not
unusual for governmental conduct to implicate, perhaps even
violate, more than one provision of the Federal Constitution.
Thus, the Soldals could allege violations of both the Due Process
Clause and the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that this
case was distinguishable from its decision in Graham v.
Connor,44 where the Court held that in an excessive force arrest
situation, the plaintiff may claim protection only under the Fourth
Amendment. 45 This is another way of saying that in the excessive
force arrest situation, the Fourth Amendment serves to pre-empt
any protection that might otherwise exist under the Due Process
Clause. 4 6 The Soldal case, however, actually involved a reverse
type of situation. The rationale of Graham was that the textually
explicit Fourth Amendment protection should be viewed as, in
effect, superseding or pre-empting the more generalized
protections of substantive due process. 47 But in Soldal it does not
logically make sense to say the opposite - that the more general
protections of due process in some way pre-empt the more
48
specific protections of the Fourth Amendment.
42. See generally Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; see also United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). In Karo, government officials, acting under a
court order, removed one of defendant's cans of ether and replaced it with
their own, equipped with a beeper. 468 U.S. at 708. The Court held that this
did not interfere with anyone's possessory interest in a meaningful way. Id. at
712.
43. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 548.

44. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
45. Id. at 388.
46. For a similar analysis in a malicious prosecution action see infra note
132.

47. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
48. In arguing for this analogy, Judge Posner asserted that:
[t]he narrow holding of Graham is that when the gist of the challenged
conduct is an arrest, the court should use the standards of the Fourth
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I believe the Court went out of its way to allay Judge Posner's
fears that finding a seizure in this case would somehow trivialize
the Fourth Amendment. He said that when dealing with so-called
garden variety repossessions, attachments and evictions, the key
is the reasonableness of the governmental conduct. 49 Typically in
those situations there is a court order and the likelihood is very
great that the court order would make the governmental action
reasonable. 5 0

I think that when one looks at what the Seventh Circuit did in
this case, and how the Supreme Court ruled, it would seem that
the Supreme Court's decision was primarily designed to lay to
rest that creative interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that had
been given by the Seventh Circuit.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Now, let me move to the second issue, municipal liability. We
are all familiar with the rule of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that requires the complaint to contain only a short and
plain statement of the plaintiffs claim. 5 1 In Conley v. Gibson,5 2
Amendment to adjudge its lawfulness even though the conduct could
also be characterized as a deprivation of liberty. But the converse should
also be true. If the gist of the challenged conduct is a repossession or
eviction conventionally challenged under the due process clause as a
deprivation, recharacterization as a Fourth Amendment seizure is
barred. The suggestion that Graham stands for the proposition that all
property disputes should so far as possible be stuffed into the Fourth
Amendment strikes us as bizarre.
Soldal, 942 F.2d at 1080. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated
that "[c]ertain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can
implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple
violations are alleged ... [the Court] examine[s] each constitutional provision
in turn." Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 548.
49. Soldal, 942 F.2d at 1076-77.
50. Id.; see, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Specht v.
Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989).
51. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a). This rule provides that a pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id.
52. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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the Supreme Court said that under Rule Eight, the plaintiff is not
required to allege the facts giving rise to the claim in any
particular detail. 53 It is sufficient that the complaint give the
defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim. 54 This
is normally referred to as the liberal notice pleading policy.
Despite the language of Rule Eight, and despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Conley, the circuit courts of appeals, each
one of them, took it upon themselves to impose some type of
heightened pleading requirement for section 1983 cases, which
requires the plaintiff to allege detailed facts in the complaint in
support of the section 1983 claim. 55 After the Monell decision, 56
where the Supreme Court held that municipalities may be liable
under section 1983, 57 most of the circuit courts took what they
thought was the next logical step. They said, "Well, you know
the heightened pleading requirement should apply as well to
section 1983 claims seeking to establish municipal liability."
Now, putting aside whether this was or was not a correct
reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this heightened
pleading requirement created real pragmatic difficulties for
section 1983 plaintiffs. In fact, one could say it created more than
a real pragmatic difficulty. The plaintiff seeking to establish
municipal liability was very much placed in a classic catch-22
type situation. Now, why do I say that? Well, in order to make
the detailed factual allegations in the complaint that the lower
federal courts were insisting upon, the plaintiff typically needed
to get to the discovery stage in order to get the necessary
information from the municipal defendants. This is the
information that would provide the basis for the detailed factual
allegations. But, here is the catch-22; they are not going to let
you get to the discovery stage unless you have detailed factual
allegations in your complaint. But one cannot make the detailed
factual allegations without the discovery. Most of the lower
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id.

55. See ScHwARTz & KIucLIN, supra note 1, at § 1.6 (compiling circuit
court decisions).
56. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
57. Id. at 701.
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courts said that is simply too bad -- no detailed factual allegations

58
in the complaint, complaint dismissed.
In the case decided last Term called Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,5 9 in a
unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the

Supreme Court rejected the heightened pleading requirement for
section 1983 municipal liability cases. 60 The County in that case
argued to the United States Supreme Court that a heightened
pleading requirement was necessary to vindicate the
municipality's immunity from suit under section 1983.61 I read
that as a type of "me too" argument. Judge Pratt referred to
qualified and absolute immunity being viewed by the United
States Supreme Court as creating an immunity from suit. 62 The
Court now takes the same position with respect to the Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 63 So the County here was making a "me
too" argument. "Since you say everybody else is immune from
suit, not just liability, we should be viewed as having immunity
from suit also." The Supreme Court said no, municipalities do

58. See, e.g., Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1987) (reiterating
that complaints involving civil rights statutes must contain specific allegations
of fact); Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that
detailed factual allegations are necessary to protect governmental functions in
civil rights actions); Fine v. New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding
complaint insufficient where it made allegations but offered no detailed
support). But see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621,
624 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that bare allegation of officials' conduct in
conformity to official policy, custom, or practice is sufficient to defeat a
motion to dismiss).
59. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
60. Id. at 1161.
61. Id. at 1162. The County argued that if a more relaxed pleading was
permitted, municipalities would be subject to expensive and time consuming
discovery in all § 1983 cases, thus eviscerating their immunity from suit and
disrupting municipal functions. Id.
62. Hon. George C. Pratt, What's Happening With Respect to the Second
Circuit, 10 TouRo L. REv. 297, at 300 (1994); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511 (1985).
63. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 113
S. Ct. 684 (1993); see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
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not have an immunity from suit under section 1983. 64 They are
only immune from respondeat superior liability. 65 One could add
that they are also immune from punitive damages, 66 but they do
not possess a fundamental immunity from liability under section
1983.67 Municipalities may be held liable under section 1983
when their policies and practices give rise to a violation of
federally protected rights. 68
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court found that the heightened
pleading requirement that the lower courts had been applying in
section 1983 municipal liability cases was totally inconsistent
with the language of Rule Eight of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 69 Rule Eight does not impose a general heightened
pleading requirement. Rule Nine, on the other hand, does require
that claims of fraud or mistake be pleaded with particularity, 70
but certainly nothing in Rules Eight or Nine imposes any
extraordinary pleading requirement for section 1983 municipal
liability cases. So, the Chief Justice invoked the well known and
71
well recognized principle, expressio unius est excIusio alterius.
Everybody, of course, knew what he was talking about, but
despite the force of this Latin command, the Supreme Court did
not go all the way in Leatherman. It made it clear that its holding
was limited to claims of municipal liability under section 1983,72
64. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
65. Id.

66. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1980).
67. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 1163. The Supreme Court flatly stated that "it is impossible to
square the 'heightened pleading standard' applied... in this case with the
liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules." Id.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This rule provides that "[i]n all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity." Id.
71. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. This Latin maxim stands for the
proposition that "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 1991).
72. The Court narrowly phrased the issue before it as: "whether a federal
court may apply a 'heightened pleading standard'- more stringent than the
usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)... in civil rights cases alleging
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and most significantly, the Court expressly left open whether
some type of heightened pleading requirement might still be
justified in cases in which the defendant is likely to raise the
defense of absolute or qualified immunity. 73 Actually, the Court
was just talking about qualified immunity, but it seems to me that
it is probably an open question with respect to claims of absolute
immunity, as well.
As I see it, the Leatherman decision is an important pragmatic
development for plaintiffs' attorneys in section 1983 litigation. It
is frequently the case that the plaintiff's attorney has some factual
basis for suspecting that what happened to her client was not just
aberrational, but was part of some broader custom or practice
within the municipality. Judge Pratt mentioned cases that would
serve to illustrate that point. 74 Alternatively, there may be some
factual basis for believing that what happened to the client was
the result of inadequate training or supervision, or some
malfunctioning in the hiring process. All the Leatherman case
does is allow the section 1983 claimant to allege these claims and
have an opportunity to prove them, to have discovery, and if the
evidence is there, to proceed to the trial stage.
IMMUNITIES
I move to the third area, the subject of immunities, and there
we had three decisions from the Supreme Court last Term. In
PuertoRico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, 75
the Supreme Court ruled that district court denials of Eleventh
Amendment immunity are immediately appealable. 7 6 That is to
municipal liability under ...

§1983." Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1161

(emphasis added).

73. Id. at 1162. The Court stated that it had "no occasion to consider
whether [its] qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened
pleading in cases involving individual governmental officials." Id.
74. See supranote 62, at 307.
75. 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993).
76. Id. at 689. The Court held that "state entities that claim to be 'arms of
the State' may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a
district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.
The collateral order doctrine says that a judgment that is not final will be
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say, an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a district court's
denial of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Now, this was not
a section 1983 case. Rather, Metcalf & Eddy was actually a
diversity case, but I choose it for inclusion in this discussion
because this is an issue, the appealability of district court denials
of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that in the past has arisen
principally in section 1983 cases, 77 and I think that this is where
it will continue to get the biggest play. The Court in Metcalf &
Eddy ruled that just like absolute and qualified immunity, the
Eleventh Amendment not only provides state government with an
immunity from liability, it also provides an immunity from suit,
that is to say, from the burdens of having to defend the
litigation. 78 The Court, in fact, explicitly referred to protecting
the state from burdensome litigation, 79 but having said all that,
the Court went on and made what I think was a somewhat
unusual comment. It said, "its ultimate justification is the
importance of insuring that the States' dignitary interests can be
fully vindicated." 80 Now, I have to confess, I do not really
understand that very much. I did not know that it was a great
indignity for states to defend against section 1983 actions. I
understand states have the Eleventh Amendment protection, but I
do not know why it is an indignity if a section 1983 plaintiff
seeks some type of relief against state government. This dignitary
interest justification was ridiculed by Justice Stevens in his

immediately appealable if it "fall[s] in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated." Id. at 687 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
77. See SCHWARTZ & KnumiN, supra note 1, at § 8.12.

78. Metcalf & Eddy, 113 S. Ct. at 687-89.
79. Id. at 689. The Court said that the "application of the collateral order
doctrine in this case is justified in part by a concern that States not be unduly
burdened by litigation.
80. Id.

. ." Id.
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dissenting opinion. 81 He termed it an "embarrassingly
82
insufficient" justification for the Court's decision.
In this case, the Court, in recognizing the right of interlocutory
appeal, rejected the plaintiff's argument that the right of
immediate appeal should only exist in those cases where there are
no factual questions relating to the immunity issue. 83 The Court
84 I
simply said, "we see little basis for drawing such a line."
read that to mean that what the Court presumably had in mind is
that the Eleventh Amendment defense is typically a defense that
is separate from the merits of the case and it is typically, though
not always, a defense that does not raise sharp factual questions.
You may get the impression that I think that the case was
wrongly decided. I think that there is a very big difference
between a claim against a public official in his or her personal
capacity and a case against a state agency or state government
itself. When suing a public official in his or her personal
capacity, the official's energy and time, and maybe even focus,
may be diverted from his or her official responsibilities. If the
official has to defend against personal liability, I think that this
phenomena -- the diversion of time and energy from official
responsibilities for defense of the lawsuit would kick in -- could
occur, and I think that provides at least an arguable basis for
recognizing that the official who is sued in his or her personal
capacity, and whose motion for qualified or absolute immunity is
denied, should have a right to test out that denial on immediate
appeal to the circuit courts of appeals. I am saying that it is at
least an arguable point. I think, however, that a case against state
government itself, whether against a state agency, state
government, or state official in an official capacity, does not raise
those types of concerns about diversion of the time and energy of
public officials from their official responsibilities. Only Justice
81. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that
while the majority recognized a "dignitary interest" for the state, a private
party defendant must still litigate a case despite an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction. Id.
82. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 689.
84. Id.
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Stevens was sharp enough to understand the distinction between
those two types of situations. 85
Now, let us move to the other immunity decisions. We have
seen in recent years a number of section 1983 lawsuits being
brought against court reporters. 86 When I think about how these
cases come about, I think about some criminal defendants, they
cannot think of anyone else to sue - I cannot get relief against
the judge, I cannot get relief against the witnesses or the
prosecutors, well, there is somebody else who may be the
wrongdoer, and that wrongdoer is the court reporter, at least in
the mind of the defendant. These cases sometimes involve claims
of conspiracy between the court reporter and the trial judge,
sometimes conspiracies between the court reporter and the
prosecutor, and sometimes conspiracies involving all three of
them. 87 They are based upon such claims as the court reporter
intentionally prepared the transcript in a misleading way, or
delayed the preparation of the transcript, or perhaps lost the
transcript, and this interfered with the criminal defendant's due
process rights. Well, an issue that has arisen over the past several
years is what type of immunity, if any, can be claimed by a court
reporter who is sued under section 1983. The United States
Supreme Court largely resolved that issue last Term in a case
called Antoine v. Byers & Anderson.88 In that case the Supreme
Court said that court reporters are not entitled to absolute
immunity. 89 They did not have absolute immunity at common
85. Id. at 691-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that
"preserving the freedom and independence that government officials need to
carry out their official duties is one thing; doing so out of concern for the
'dignitary' interest of a State... is quite another." Id. at 692.
86. See, e.g., Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1085 (1990); Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1989); Holt v. Dunn, 741 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1984); Green v. Maraio,
722 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1983).
87. See Dellenbach, 889 F.2d 755 (action against judge and two court
reporters); Scruggs, 870 F.2d 376 (action against judge, court reporter, and
prosecutor); Green, 722 F.2d 755 (same); see also Holt, 741 F.2d 169 (action
against court reporter alone).
88. 113 S. Ct. 2167 (1993).
89. Id. at 2172.
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law. 90 In terms of quasi-judicial immunity, they were arguing
that they are really part of the judicial process. 9 1 Court reporters
do not, however, engage in the type of discretionary decisionmaking or exercise of judgment that is typically associated with
judicial immunity. 92 Now, while the Court did not spell it out,
presumably in rejecting absolute immunity for court reporters,
the Court would hold that court reporters could claim qualified
immunity. The Court did not talk about qualified immunity, but I
think that is the natural implication.
There is one variation of the court reporter issue that the Court
did not discuss. Would the situation be different if the court
reporter acted pursuant to a specific order of a judge? In other
words, would the action pursuant to the judicial order then
provide some justification for granting the court reporter absolute
immunity? The Court did not talk about that issue, but there is an
interesting recent decision from the Eighth Circuit that deals with
the immunity to which a warden who had detained a prisoner
pursuant to a facially valid court order was entitled. 93 The Eighth
Circuit said that because the warden was acting pursuant to a
facially valid court order, he should be given absolute immunity
from liability. 94 The circuit court spoke about absolute immunity
being justified on the basis of the public policy of encouraging
public officials to comply with, and thereby vindicate, judicial
orders. 95 What is interesting to me is that in reaching that result,
90. Id. at 2170. In the alternative, the respondents argued that the
common-law judges who made handwritten notes during trials should be
treated as their historical counterparts. Id. The Court found this analogy to be
unpersuasive because, whereas court reporters are charged by statute with
producing a "verbatim" transcript of the proceedings, common-law judges had
much discretion in deciding what they wrote. Id. at 2170-71.
91. Id. at 2171.
92. Id. at 2171-72.
93. Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 1239.

95. Id. at 1240. The court stated that "[i]f wardens do not have absolute
immunity ... they will become a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed
at judicial orders." Id. The court emphasized the necessity for officials to be
able to rely on court orders that are facially valid, as well as the need for the
courts to trust that their orders would be carried through. Id. at 1241.
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and the name of the case is Patterson v. Von Riesen, the Eighth
Circuit said that Antoine and Byers was distinguishable because,
in that case, no court order had been issued affecting the court
reporter. 96 Which again, you know, raises in one's mind whether
perhaps the court reporter issue should be analyzed or evaluated
differently if there is a judicial order.
The third immunity decision in my mind is by far the most
important of the Supreme Court's three immunity decisions, and I
think that it is probably the most important section 1983 decision
decided by the Court last Term. That is the decision dealing with
prosecutorial immunity, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.97 Now, in the
Buckley case, the United States Supreme Court rendered two
rulings. First, the Court unanimously ruled that a prosecutor's
participation in a press conference announcing an indictment is
not shielded by absolute immunity; 98 and secondly - it is this
second issue that provoked a five to four split among the Justices
- a prosecutor's alleged fabrication of evidence during the preindictment stage is also not protected by absolute prosecutorial
immunity. 99 The complaint in Buckley alleged the following: The
section 1983 plaintiff, Stephen Buckley, had been arrested and
detained in jail for three years on charges that grew out of a
highly publicized murder of an eleven-year-old child. 100 The
section 1983 complaint alleged that, in order to secure the
indictment, the prosecutors fabricated evidence against
Buckley. 10 1 The fabricated evidence related to a boot print that
had been found on the door of the home of the child who had
been murdered. 102 The boot print, presumably, was the boot
print of the killer who had allegedly kicked in the door in order
96. Id.
97. 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
98. Id. at 2617. Justice Kennedy, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Souter joined, agreed with the majority that there is no
absolute immunity for statements made during a press conference. Id. at 2620
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2615.
100. Id. at 2609.
101. Id. at 2610.

102. Id.
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to enter the home. 103 The prosecutors had three separate studies
done by law enforcement officers attempting to link up the boot
print on the door with a pair of boots that Stephen Buckley had
voluntarily turned over to the law enforcement authorities.104
After engaging in the three separate studies, they were unable to
link up Stephen Buckley's boots with the boot prints. 105 Of
course, that did not stop the prosecutorial authorities. They then
enlisted the assistance of an anthropologist named Louise
Robbins, who is described in the section 1983 complaint as
being, now I am just quoting here, I am not defaming anybody,
"well known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert
testimony."106 So now, armed with the testimony of Louise
Robbins, the prosecutors were able to secure a Grand Jury
indictment against Stephen Buckley. 10 7
Following the indictment, of course, the next logical step that
follows in criminal procedure is that a press conference is held,
at which time the indictment is announced. The section 1983
complaint alleged that, at the press conference, the prosecutor
made some false statements concerning the evidence that
allegedly linked Stephen Buckley to this particular crime. 10 8 In
addition, "mug shots" of Buckley were distributed to the media
at the press conference. 109 Buckley's bail was set at three million
dollars. 110 Not surprisingly, he was not able to raise it and so he
remained incarcerated while he was tried.11 At the trial, the
main prosecution witness was Louise Robbins. Based upon the
evidence presented at the trial, the jury failed to reach a verdict
and a mistrial was declared. 112 The prosecutors, undaunted, said
"we will just try him again, right?" 113 So Buckley remained in
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2610-11.
108. Id. at 2617.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 2611.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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jail. While in jail pending the second trial, a third party confessed
to the crime. 114 Buckley was still not released. 115 He was only
released and the charges dropped against him after Louise
1 6
Robbins, the prosecution's star witness, passed away. 1
Well, Stephen Buckley gave some thought to his last three
years and, not surprisingly, he asserted a claim in federal court
under section 1983.117 He asserted claims sounding in false
arrest, false incarceration, and malicious prosecution. 118 One of
the major issues in the case, since the alleged wrongdoers
included the prosecutorial authorities, was whether these
prosecutorial authorities should have absolute immunity with
respect to the announcement of the indictment at the press
conference, and the alleged fabrication of evidence relating to the
boot print. 119
The Seventh Circuit in this case had ruled that the prosecutors
were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to
both issues. 120 The rationale that the Seventh Circuit judges gave
for coming to that conclusion is that the press conference and the
fabrication of evidence could only have caused injury to Stephen
12 1
Buckley at the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings.
They read the Supreme Court decisions dealing with
prosecutorial immunity 122 as granting absolute prosecutorial
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For an express delineation of these three counts in Stephen Buckley's
original complaint see Buckley v. County of Dupage, No. 88-C1939, 1989 WL
64321, at *1 (N.D. l. June 9, 1989).
119. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611.

120. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1240 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
121. Id. (stating that "residual injuries [from prosecution] have never been
deemed sufficient to call for damages against public prosecutors. .. ").
122. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
(1984); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323 (1940).
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immunity when the injury is associated with the judicial phase of
12 3
a criminal proceeding.
The United States Supreme Court, in evaluating the
prosecutorial immunity issue, said, "we make two important
assumptions about the case." 124 The first is not particularly
startling. The Court said it was going to assume that the
allegations in the complaint are true. 125 Okay. The case has not
been tried yet so the court is going to assume that the facts
asserted in the complaint are true. That is not particularly
surprising. The second assumption that the Court was willing to
make, though, is much more significant. The Court was also
willing to assume that the complaint asserted a violation of
constitutionally protected rights.126 Now, it seems to me that this
is both important and interesting, and even a controversial
assumption, for at least two reasons. One, Judge Pratt referred
earlier to the Supreme Court's decision in the case called Siegert
v. Gilley, 127 but what the Supreme Court said in Siegert was that
when you have a claim of qualified immunity, the federal court
should first look and determine whether the complaint states a
violation of constitutionally protected rights. 128 This is because
there is no sense in evaluating whether it is a violation of clearly
established constitutional rights if the complaint does not even
state a violation of constitutional rights. Well, the Supreme Court
in Buckley paid absolutely no attention to Siegert. It may be that
what it had in mind was that absolute immunity somehow is
different in terms of the methodology for evaluating absolute
immunity, as compared to qualified immunity. But it seems to me
rather odd that the Court made absolutely no reference to Siegert.
The second reason why I think it is an important assumption
that the complaint stated a violation of constitutionally protected
123. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1241. The Seventh Circuit stated that, in such a
case, "the defendant must look to the court in which the case pends to protect
his interests." Id.
124. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2609.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
128. Id. at 1793.
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rights in Buckley is because it is very frequently the fact in
section 1983 cases against prosecutors that the plaintiff is alleging

some type of egregious wrongdoing. 12 9 It is not always obvious,
however, that this type of wrongdoing gets translated into a
130 I
violation of some provision of the federal Constitution.
suppose the most significant of Buckley's section 1983 claims
was his claim of malicious prosecution. The issue of whether
malicious prosecution is by itself a constitutional wrong is
13 1 The
pending before the United States Supreme Court now.
Supreme Court has granted plenary review in a case from the

Seventh Circuit that raises the issue of whether malicious
prosecution is solely a matter of state tort law, or governmental
action that gives rise to a violation of constitutionally protected
rights. 132 In any case, the Court in Buckley did make the
129. See Siano v. Justices of Mass., 698 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.) (alleging use of
forged evidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d
320 (2d Cir.) (alleging coercion of perjured testimony from witnesses), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 861 (1980); Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.
1978) (alleging destruction of a lineup report and police tapes of incoming
calls).
130. See, e.g., Prince v. Wallace, 568 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (claims of
deprivation of right to speedy trial and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment summarily dismissed); Black v. Cloose, 612 F. Supp. 470 (D.
Minn. 1984) (enforcement of alleged unconstitutional traffic law is not a
deprivation of right to travel), aff'd, 758 F.2d 317 (1985); Halpern v. City of
New Haven, 489 F. Supp. 841 (D. Conn. 1980) (prosecutor's discretion on
whether to investigate).
131. Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 1382 (1993). Editor's note: Subsequent to this symposium, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding that malicious prosecution by
itself is not a constitutional wrong. Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).
132. In Albright, a plurality of the Court held that a § 1983 malicious
prosecution action based solely on a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process violation was not actionable. 114 S. Ct. at 814. Albright alleged that
the Defendant, Detective Oliver, deprived him of substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 810-11. Albright argued that he was
deprived of his "'liberty interest'-to be free from criminal prosecution except
upon probable cause." Id. The Court, quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989), stated that a constitutional claim should not be brought under
substantive due process when there exists an "'explicit textual source of
constitutional protection.'" Id. at 813. Since the Court found the Fourth
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assumption that in this case, the complaint stated a violation of
constitutional rights, and evaluated only the question of
prosecutorial immunity.
The Supreme Court rejected out of hand what it referred to as
the "unprecedented" location of injury theory that had been
articulated by the Seventh Circuit. 133 I do not think
unprecedented is anything but unflattering. That is like calling the
other decision "creative." 134 That was creative, this one is
unprecedented. But what the Supreme Court meant by its
reference to "unprecedented" is that it found the Seventh Circuit
analysis of the immunity issue to be fundamentally at odds with
its immunity jurisprudence which takes a functional approach to
the immunity issue. 135 That is to say, the Court focuses on the
nature of the function carried out by the official, not the nature of
the injury and not the point in time at which the injury sets in. 136
Having taken care of the Seventh Circuit's location of injury
theory, the Court then evaluated the two issues -- the press

conference issue and the fabrication of evidence issue. With
respect to the press conference issue, the Court was unanimous.
The Court had no trouble concluding that the announcement of an
indictment at a press conference is simply not a part of the
prosecutor's advocacy function. 137 The Court looked at prior
Supreme Court prosecutorial immunity decisions, 138 and found
the prosecutorial immunity justified when the prosecutor acts as
an advocate in a judicial proceeding, not when the prosecutor acts

Amendment was created to protect against "pretrial deprivations of liberty[,]"
it reasoned that this would be the appropriate basis for Albright's § 1983
malicious prosecution action. Id. at 813. However, since no Fourth
Amendment claim was presented to the Supreme Court, the Court declined to
rule on the possible outcome of such a claim. Id. at 814.
133. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2611, 2615 (1993).

134. See Soldal v. County of Cook, 113 S.Ct. 538, 547-48 (1992); see
generally supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Buckley, 113 S.Ct. at 2615.
Id.
Id. at 2618.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409 (1976).
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in an administrative or investigatory capacity, 139 and found that
participating in a press conference is simply not advocacy. 140
Although, when I think about it, I am sure that there are a certain
number of prosecutors who do view announcing the indictment as
part of their advocacy function, and I think there are probably a
good many defense attorneys who would agree with that type of
characterization.
It was the other issue, the alleged manufacture of evidence, that
provoked the five to four split on the ruling of the Supreme
Court. Now, on this issue, the essential question for the Supreme
Court was this: are we talking about conduct by the prosecutors
which was part of their preparation for judicial proceedings,
either for the Grand Jury or for trial? If we can characterize what
the prosecutors did in this case as preparation for trial, then we
are in a position to say that it is part of the advocacy function,
and the advocacy function is shielded by absolute prosecutorial
immunity. 14 1 On the other hand, if we characterize what the
prosecutors did in this case, not as part of the preparation for
trial or as part of their advocacy function, but as an investigatory
activity (i.e., if the prosecutor acted like a police officer or a
detective), under the functional approach, the prosecutors can
claim only the same qualified immunity that the detective can
claim. 14 2

The majority and the dissent agreed upon how the issue should
be framed, but the majority of five Justices said this is clearly
investigative, there is no question about it.143 After reading it,
you wonder how there can be a dissent in this case. The majority
said this was clearly an investigatory function being carried out,
because the alleged fabrication of boot print evidence occurred
well before there was probable cause to arrest Stephen
Buckley.144 It was well before the prosecutors even claimed that
139. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. at 2615-18.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 2618.
Id. at 2615.
Id. at 2616.
Id.
Id.
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they had probable cause to arrest him. 145 And so the majority
determined that the prosecutors were involved in an investigatory
task, rather than an advocacy function. 146 Therefore, they cannot
claim absolute prosecutorial immunity,
only qualified
immunity. 147
When you read the dissenting opinion, you think you are in a
different world. The dissenters say this was clearly an example of
preparation for trial. 148 The prosecutors were dealing with the
presentation of evidence and they were thinking about presenting
witnesses and evidence at the Grand Jury, and later at trial, as
part of their preparation for trial. Thus, the dissenters said they
were clearly entitled to absolute immunity. 149 Now, it is obvious,
I think, to anyone who reads the majority and the dissent, that we
now know what the rule is. We know the line that the Supreme
Court is drawing between advocacy functions and investigatory
functions. I think it is also obvious that this is a very difficult line
to draw. I think it is a subtle line. Justice Scalia, in his
concurring opinion, said that it is not really that difficult and that
he had an easy answer for it. The answer is that an official who
claims absolute immunity has the burden of establishing it and if
the defendant prosecutors are not able to establish entitlement to
absolute immunity, they are simply going to have to settle for
150
qualified immunity.
I think that one lesson that comes out of the case is that it is
very important to pay close attention to the time frame in which
the alleged misconduct by the prosecutors occurs. If the conduct
occurred prior to the time when there was either a finding of
probable cause, or at least prior to the time when the prosecutors
claimed to have probable cause, there is a strong likelihood that
the function that the prosecutors were engaged in is going to be
viewed as being an investigatory function. 15 1 Whereas, the other
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2617.
Id. at 2621 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2621-22 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

150. Id. at 2610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 2615-16 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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side of the coin is that what the prosecutors do in the postprobable cause stage is very likely to be viewed as advocacy and
protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 152 Although, as

the Court points out, it is not to be misread as drawing a very
clear, so called "bright line," because it may be that even in the
post-probable cause time frame, the prosecutors start acting like
detectives again. 153 You know, they went out and investigated
for more evidence, in which case, of course, we are back to an
investigatory function.
The reports that I have seen, one in particular in the Legal
Times of Washington, indicated, and it is not particularly
surprising, that prosecutors are very upset about the Supreme
Court's decision in the Buckley case. 154 They do make an
important point. Prosecutors today are increasingly becoming
involved in investigatory work and some of this is a result of
their participation in task forces that are formulated to tackle
drug networks and other types of complex criminal operations.
They make the point that in the real world, this line between
advocacy functions and investigatory functions is not as clear as
the majority of the Supreme Court would like it to be. 155 Now,
the dissenters in Buckley say, as a result of the majority's
decision, this may prompt prosecutors to seek quicker probable
cause determinations from the trial court. 15 6 You know, because
once there is a probable cause determination, then the likelihood
is greatly enhanced that the prosecutor will be shielded by
absolute immunity. But the prosecutors say that the danger is
really much greater, that the danger might be that prosecutors
may now be deterred from engaging in investigatory activities. 15 7
We are going to have to wait and see how this plays out, both
pragmatically and legally, because I do not think by a long shot
that this is the last word by the Supreme Court on what
152.
153.
154.
WASH.,

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2616, n.5.
See Naftali Bendavid, Limiting ProsecutorialPower, LEGAL TiMS OF
Aug. 9, 1993, at S25.

155. See supra note 154.
156. Buckley, 114 S. Ct. at 2623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. See supra note 154.
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ultimately comes down to attempting to define what is the
prosecutorial function, and what is the advocacy function, of the
prosecutor.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Now, let me just spend a few minutes on this last subject of
attorneys' fees. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of
1976, which is 42 U.S.C. § 1988,158 is the Congressional statute
that authorizes awards of attorneys' fees in section 1983 cases.
There are three important points for present purposes about that
statute. One, it makes the award of attorneys' fees discretionary
for the trial judge. Two, the only one who is eligible for an
award of attorneys' fees is a "prevailing party." And three, if
fees are awarded, the statute says the court should award
"reasonable" attorneys' fees. 159 So those are the three concepts
that I think are important in understanding what the Supreme
Court did last Term in a very important decision called Farrarv.
Hobby. 160
In Farrar,the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a
section 1983 plaintiff, who only recovers one dollar in nominal
damages, is, nevertheless, a prevailing party who is entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees under section 1988.161 Now, I think one
way to look at what the Court did in this case is that there are
really two different rulings in the case. All of the Justices agreed
that a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is
nevertheless a "prevailing party" who is potentially eligible for
an award of fees under section 1988.162 The thinking was that,
the Court's view of who is a prevailing plaintiff has been, in

158. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1993). Subsection (b) of this statute provides in
pertinent part that "[iln any action or proceeding to enforce... [§ 1983] the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
159. Id.
160. 113 S.Ct. 566 (1992).
161. Id. at 570.
162. Id. at 573.
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prior Supreme Court decisions, 163 a generous one, and the Court
has said that any relief by a court which materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior qualifies the plaintiff as a prevailing
party. 164 Here, the thinking goes, an award of nominal damages
does alter the legal relationship between the parties. It does force
an alteration of the defendant's conduct. After all, the defendant
has to turn over money to the plaintiff, even if it is a measly one
dollar bill, or perhaps four quarters.
Now, that did not resolve the question of whether the plaintiff
in this particular case was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.
I mean, we say that the plaintiff is a prevailing party by
recovering nominal damages. That only qualifies a plaintiff as
being potentially eligible for an award of attorney fees. Whether
or not attorneys' fees should be awarded, well, that is in the
discretion of the trial judge, and if fees are awarded, the amount
is also in the trial judge's discretion. Having concluded that this
plaintiff was a prevailing party by the recovery of nominal
damages, the Justices in effect said to themselves - they did not
come out and say this in so many words, but I think this is what
is going on - "we really have a very extreme case here." Now,
why was it an extreme case? The plaintiff in this case sought only
monetary damages 165 and the plaintiff was not, you know, the
modest sort. The complaint sought compensatory damages of
seventeen million dollars against six different defendants. 166
Seeking seventeen million dollars against six different defendants
and winding up with a recovery of one dollar in nominal damages
against one defendant made the Court think about whether this is
163. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489
U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989) (stating that to be considered a prevailing party
plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute materially altering
the legal relationship); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)
(holding plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties if they succeed on any
significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought).
164. Id.
165. 113 S. Ct. at 566. The plaintiff's original claim for injunctive relief
was not pursued. Id. at 570.
166. Id. at 570.
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a plaintiff who should be awarded attorneys' fees under section
1988. Think about what the district court did in this case. The
district court awarded the plaintiff attorneys' fees of $280,000,
167
$27,932 in expenses, and $9,730 in pre-judgment interest.
Now, after doing some quick arithmetic, that is well over
$300,000. So, the Court said that in this case, while it found that
the Fifth Circuit was wrong in concluding that the plaintiff was
not a prevailing party, under these types of circumstances, the
only reasonable fee is no fee.168 The appropriate exercise of
discretion, given this extreme type of situation, is that no fees
should be awarded. There is language in Justice Thomas' opinion
for the majority that could lead one to conclude that normally
when only nominal damages are recovered, perhaps it is
16 9
appropriate to either award no fees or a very low fee.
Well, there are only five justices who voted on this question of
whether the plaintiff should be awarded fees. 17 0 The question
presented to the Court was whether the plaintiff was a prevailing
party. 17 1 Of the five who voted that fees should not be awarded
to this plaintiff, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which she took the position that the differential
between what the plaintiff had sought in this case -- the seventeen

million dollars and the one dollar nominal damages recovered -should not be the only factor a court should consider. 17 2 A court
should also look to the public importance of the litigation. 173 It
might be that the plaintiff only recovered a dollar, but there
might be important legal issues being litigated. 174 Also, she said
a court should focus upon whether the litigation, even though it
only culminated in a one dollar nominal damage award,
167. Id.

168. Id. at 575.
169. Id. The Court stated that "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for

monetary relief ...the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id.
170. The five Justices were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,

O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
171. 113 S. Ct. at 570.

172. Id. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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accomplished some public good, such as deterring lawless
behavior in the future or vindicating some type of important

right.175

Some things about Farrarare unclear, at least in my mind. I do
not think we know how much weight lower courts are going to
be giving to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. In other
words, are they going to place more emphasis upon the opinion
for the Court, which, as I said, could be read to mean usually no
fees or very low fees for a plaintiff who only gets nominal
damages. Or, on the other hand, are they going to engage in
more of the type of case-by-case evaluation that Justice O'Connor
advocates, which would focus on factors other than the disparity
between the nominal damages recovered and the amount
requested.
To focus on the open questions, what would one do in the case
of a plaintiff who comes into federal court and says implicitly, "I
am the noble sort, I am the non-materialistic sort, I only want
one dollar to vindicate my constitutionally protected rights" and
the court indeed finds a violation of constitutional protected
rights? The jury gives the plaintiff the one dollar and then we
have a motion for attorneys' fees for seventy-five thousand
dollars. I think how that situation is going to be handled is
problematical. Thank you very much.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Marty, thank you very much. Gary Shaw, you have been
sitting patiently, and probably have a whole list of comments to
make.

Professor Gary M. Shaw:
And in the interest of brevity, I will not mention them all.
Although I sort of tend to be more skeptical about noble
plaintiffs, I do not think it will be as big a problem as you may
think.
175. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
There are some.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:
There are some, but I suspect more of them will be going for
the money. Let me just make one comment and then ask one
question. I want to go back to the Soldal 176 case for a moment. I
suspect from my own perspective that, in some respects, the
Seventh Circuit did not have to worry that this was going to
create a tremendous amount of new litigation, only because of the
DeShaney1 77 case, and it seems to me the reason that the plaintiff
could get around DeShaney here was that the plaintiff claimed
there was a conspiracy between the private actors and the
police. 178 And it seems to me that what the complaint could have
said was that the police stood there and did nothing and there was
no sort of conspiracy or concerted action. Then, DeShaney would
have ruled, and so I think that the Seventh Circuit's concern was
somewhat overstated. My question, I guess, would be that I have
been listening to you for five years now, Marty, talking about
trends in section 1983, and my recollection is that in earlier years
your comments were not that there was a mixed bag so much as a
series of cases that favored defendants rather than plaintiffs and
now I am listening to you say, a mixed bag. Do you see this as a
trend that is going to continue further in the plaintiffs' direction
or do you see it peaking sort of here? And at the risk of asking
you to prognosticate unfairly, do you think the elevation of Judge

176. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992); see generally supra notes 24-50 and
accompanying text.
177. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 481 U.S. 189

(1989) (holding that due process does not impose upon a state an affirmative
duty to protect its citizen from parental abuse).
178. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 1075 (citing Soldal, 923 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992)). It was alleged that the deputy sheriff and
Terrace Properties joined efforts in an attempt to get rid of a tenant. Id.
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Ginsburg to the Court 179 is going to make a difference in that
area?
ProfessorMartinA. Schwartz:
Well, there are about five different questions there.
Professor Gary M. Shaw:

Typical professor.
ProfessorMartinA. Schwartz:
Typical professor. I do not think that what the Supreme Court
did last Term 180 is going to work any monumental changes in
section 1983 litigation or in constitutional litigation. Judge Pratt
and I have talked about this often. What seems to be taking place
is a type of fine tuning of section 1983 law. There are some
details being worked out, such as how the courts should handle
nominal damages and how to more precisely evaluate
prosecutorial immunity. But the basic framework of section 1983
litigation dealing with issues such as municipal liability and the
immunities that officials can claim is in place, and that basic
framework makes it very difficult, in my mind, for the plaintiff
to recover. It makes it difficult, pragmatically, from an economic
feasibility standpoint, and it makes it difficult legally. I mean,
179. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was nominated to the Supreme Court on June 14,
1993 and was sworn in on Tuesday, August 10, 1993.
180. Among the important § 1983 cases decided in the October 1992 Term
were: Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (discussing
prosecutorial immunity); Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993)
(involving prisoners' rights and the Eighth Amendment); Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, 113 S. Ct. 2167 (1993) (denying court reporters absolute
immunity); Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (overruling
the heightened pleading rule in municipal liability claims); Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993)
(permitting immediate appeals when Eleventh Amendment immunity is
denied); Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) (involving attorney fees in
instance in which only nominal damages were awarded); Soldal v. Cook
County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992) (discussing Fourth Amendment seizures).
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one should not ever underestimate how forceful this interlocutory
appeal is with respect to denials of qualified immunity. That is
the most recurring issue and it often means that the case never
gets to the merits, and that whoever brings this case has to
immediately be prepared to shoulder the financial expense of an
appeal in the circuit court. That is usually before they have even
gotten to the discovery stage. The other thing that I think one has
to always keep in mind in evaluating where the Supreme Court is
going in section 1983 litigation, is that none of what the Supreme
Court does with respect to the details of section 1983 matters at
all, unless there are meaningful constitutionally protected rights
for plaintiffs to enforce. Because you always come back to this
fundamental point: section 1983 itself does not create any
federally protected rights, it is just a type of remedial vehicle for
the enforcement of rights that are created by the Federal
Constitution, and in some instances created by federal statutes.
So I do not think that one should draw any broad conclusions
from some of what one could say are pro-plaintiff decisions
rendered by the Supreme Court last Term, and they are not all
pro-plaintiff decisions. The nominal fee decision, for example, is
not. 18 1 The Eleventh Amendment decision is not. 182 Section
1983 is a hard area to evaluate from an overall standpoint,
precisely because the area is so vast and because it is so
multifaceted.
I do not know if it is valuable to say much about Justice
Ginsburg. I do not know if I am in a better position than anybody
else to start talking about how she will affect the Court's future
decisions.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Before you put away your crystal ball, and perhaps you too
Gary, do you think Leathermanl83 is going to be restricted to no
181. Farrah v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992); see generally supra notes
160-175 and accompanying text.
182. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 113 S. Ct.
684 (1993); see generally supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
183. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993); see generally supra notes 59-74.
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heightened pleading just with municipal liability claims, or could
it be a harbinger of maybe a new era in federal pleading, kind of
get back to basics, look at the federal rules and do not go any
further?
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
Judge Pratt and I just spent two days last week at a section
1983 conference for the Practicing Law Institute. We were
involved with a large number of people who have great expertise
in the section 1983 area and I would say - tell me if you agree
with this - that the prevailing sentiment seemed to be that the
logic of the Leatherman case would naturally apply to all section
1983 claims, that there is simply nothing in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that sanctions a heightened pleading requirement
in any section 1983 case. I am somewhat more skeptical. I am
more skeptical for two reasons. One, because if that was so, why
did the Supreme Court not simply come out and say, you know,
no heightened pleading requirement at all in section 1983 cases.
True, we just have the municipal liability issue before us, but
why do we not just take care of the whole thing? I am skeptical
for this reason, and I am also skeptical because of how protective
the Supreme Court has been of section 1983 defendants with
respect to qualified immunity. 184 I think that this protective
attitude in the qualified immunity area could lead the Supreme
Court to say that to defeat qualified immunity, the complaint has
185
to state factual allegations in some detail.

184. Section 1983 itself does not provide for any immunities. However, the
Supreme Court has never interpreted this to mean that Congress, which
enacted § 1983, intended to exclude common law immunities. SCHWARTZ &
KIPKLiN, supra note 1, at § 9.1 (main volume only). Further, the Court has
held that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not a mere defense to
it. In fact, immunities are considered so important that a denial of qualified
immunity is immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals. SCHWARrZ &
KmKN, supra note 1, § 9.2 (main volume only) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
185. Many circuit cases have required detailed factual allegations in such
cases. 1 SCHWARTZ AND KMKLIN, supra note 1, at § 9.25.
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
Apparently, there have already been a number of decisions
around the country, both at the circuit 186 and district court 187
levels, that seek to limit Leatherman and preserve the heightened
pleading rule for other aspects of section 1983 cases. Judges like
the heightened pleading rule as a docket-clearing type of device.
If you can throw out a case on the face of a motion to dismiss, it
just speeds things along. I just wonder if the Supreme Court has
not resisted. It was a unanimous decision. I know they made the
exception, they said they were not deciding it, but the issue was
not before them either. It was proper judicial conduct to say, "we
are only going to decide the question before us."
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
But there are a large number of cases where the Supreme Court
does go beyond the particular question before the Court and, you
know, one could say that this was a question presented.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Sometimes that is the only thing they decide.
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
One could phrase the issue differently. One could say the issue
in this case is whether a heightened pleading requirement is

186. Some courts have held that Leathernan does not extend to cases
involving individual government officials. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir.
1993).

187. See, e.g., Mastroiann v. Deering, 835 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1993)
(applying heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 conspiracy action);
McDonald v. City of Freeport, 834 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (employing
the heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 action against government
official); Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F. Supp. 701 (holding that § 1983
cases alleging conspiracy require heightened pleading) (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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appropriate in a section 1983 case, so I do not think it would be
wrong to go all the way.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Shaw, anything further?
Professor Gary M. Shav:
No. I guess I sort of share Marty's skepticism. If the Court had
wanted to abolish the heightened pleading rule, I think it
probably would have come out in favor of this. This is a
unanimous decision. This is not one of those cases where they
are trying to cobble together a majority and say, okay, the only
way we can cobble together a majority is to have this precise
specific rule. Rather, they had unanimity. If they had wished to
go further, they probably would have done so, even losing one or
two votes. On that basis, it would not have made a difference. So
I guess I sort of share Marty's skepticism, although at the same
time, given the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I think the
courts are probably correct in abolishing the heightened pleading
rule, and judges' dockets notwithstanding, I think it should be
applicable to-other issues as well.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Any comment from the audience? Yes.
Audience Member:
I need to ask a question. Before I ask a question, am I right in
remembering that Grand Jurors enjoy the protection of absolute
immunity?18 8 Then I have trouble understanding how the Grand
Jury can execute its investigatory function without the assistance
of a prosecutor. It seems to me impossible, so I have a very hard
time understanding how a prosecutor carrying out an
188. Grand jurors do enjoy absolute immunity. Decamp v. Douglas County,

978 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3036 (1993).
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investigative function in conjunction with the Grand Jury
investigation before a probable cause determination or after a
probable cause determination, cannot be entitled to that same
protection, especially in light of the other decisions, you know,
with the warden that you pointed out. 189
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
I think the answer is that the prosecutors' activities in
presenting the case to the Grand Jury would clearly be considered
to be advocacy in nature. It is the functions that are carried out
prior to that point in time that might not be protected by absolute
immunity.
Audience Member:
But the placing of evidence before the Grand Jury can only
occur after the prosecutor has helped guide it. It is not a secret
that with complex areas of crime you need minds that are willing
to chase people and put it together. It is not a surprise that the
Grand Jury has helped the investigation whether you think of that
as advocacy or investigation. I, myself, think of it as
investigation, but I still think that it should be cloaked with the
same degree of protection as that of the Grand Jury which
investigates it.
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
You are talking from the standpoint of a former prosecutor and
you know the judges think that they are entitled to absolute
immunity and the court reporters would also like absolute
immunity. Everybody that does what they do would like absolute
immunity. But the question becomes, what is the rationale behind
the immunity? And the rationale behind prosecutorial immunity is
to try to protect those functions which are very closely associated
with the judicial process. In other words, the way Professor
189. Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1993); see supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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Neuborne 190 describes it, it is putting a type of cone over the
judicial proceeding and everybody who is under the cone gets
shielded by absolute immunity, but at some point you are outside
of the cone and you are not acting in a prosecutorial manner, but
you are acting as a detective or police official.
Audience Member:
That is right, but my question is that if the Grand Jury itself is
inside the cone... ?
ProfessorMartinA. Schwartz:
Well, the jurors are viewed as judges. In effect they are making
a judgmental decision, so you want to protect their judging
because you do not want their judging to be influenced, how they
may ultimately vote on this question of whether or not to indict,
by potential liability.
Audience Member:
Let me ask you this: In the Buckley case, was the investigation
carried out in conjunction with the Grand Jury or was it
independent of the Grand Jury investigation?
ProfessorMartinA. Schwartz:
At the time that the prosecutors were acting, there was no
Grand Jury.191

190. Professor Neuborne is a Professor of Law at New York University
School of Law. He has served as Staff Counsel to the New York Civil

Liberties Union from 1967-72, Assistant Legal Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union from 1972-76, and National Legal Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union from 1974-78. Professor Neuborne has also lectured
extensively on the topic of Civil Rights, including at several of the Practicing
Law Institute Symposiums.
191. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2608 (1993).
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Audience Member:
Do you think that distinction is relevant?
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
What seems to be critical is whether or not the prosecutors
have sought a probable cause determination. I think that is the
critical point in time, and this may prompt some prosecutors to
seek probable cause determinations earlier on in the game.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Schweitzer, 192 1 see you have a microphone.
Audience Member:
I have a non-prosecutorial reaction to the Buckley case. It
seems to me that fabrication of evidence, at least with certain
crimes, would be one of the grossest scandals and miscarriages of
justice if it led to the case being decided the wrong way. I am
amused about the distinction between the investigatory and the
prosecutorial functions here, and it strikes me that perhaps the
reason that it is not such a controversial matter is that when it
comes to alleged fabrication of expert evidence, many of us have
a somewhat cynical view or skeptical view of the nature of expert
testimony. In any event, I suppose my question is: What if the
prosecutors had been accused of manufacturing physical
evidence, is there any way to make that reprehensible and
actionable in any stage of the proceeding and might the case
come out differently?
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
I think you have to evaluate it from the same perspective. It
seems to me that the manufacturing of evidence is probably going
192. Professor Thomas Schweitzer is an Associate Professor at Touro
College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/4

40

1994]

Schwartz: Section 1983

SECTION 1983

353

to be easier to characterize as investigatory, because it is harder
to call it preparation for trial if what you are doing is trying to
bring something into existence, in the first instance, that simply
did not exist there before. So, I think the analysis is the same.
What were they doing, were they acting as advocates or were
they acting as detectives? I think it is going to be hard to
conclude that they are acting as advocates when what they are
doing is trying to create a piece of evidence that simply did not
exist before.
Audience Member:
It strikes me then, if that is so, it shows the total inadequacy of
the conceptional approach.
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
Remember one thing, these are allegations in the complaint,
they are not facts that have been resolved. Then, you know, it is
very common for individuals, not only those who have been
convicted, but also individuals who have just been put through
the criminal process, to work out in their own minds that they
have been subjected to this because of what those terrible
prosecutors, witnesses, and trial judges did to them. And
sometimes there is a factual basis for those allegations and
sometimes there is more of a mental contrivance on the part of
the individual.
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